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ILLEGITIMATE CITIZENSHIP RULES 
LETICIA SAUCEDO* AND ROSE CUISON VILLAZOR** 
ABSTRACT 
In 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, a 
challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1409, the law governing the conferral of U.S. 
citizenship to children born abroad to parents who are U.S. citizens. As the 
Court noted in a forceful opinion, § 1409 imposed different and more 
onerous physical presence requirements on unwed fathers than unwed 
mothers, making it difficult for nonmarital fathers to transmit their U.S. 
citizenship to their foreign-born children. Such distinctions, the Court 
concluded, were rooted in archaic gender stereotypes and thus 
incompatible with equal protection principles.  
Although Morales-Santana corrected the gender discrimination inherent 
in § 1409, it said nothing of the statute’s other constitutionally infirm 
provisions. Although it has drawn little attention, § 1409 also discriminates 
on the basis of illegitimacy, which like gender, is a quasi-suspect 
classification for purposes of equal protection law. Specifically, § 1409 
requires nonmarital children to prove that they have been legitimated by 
their unwed U.S. citizen fathers to establish their derivative citizenship 
claim. By contrast, foreign-born children in wedlock need not show that 
they have been legitimated; by virtue of their parents’ marriage, they are 
legally recognized as “legitimate” children. These legitimation 
requirements have made it more difficult for foreign-born nonmarital 
children of U.S. citizen parents to prove what should be regarded as their 
pre-existing citizenship. Crucially, in general, laws such as these that 
distinguish on the basis of a parents’ marital status constitute illegitimacy 
discrimination. Yet, the Court in Morales-Santana neglected to 
acknowledge this unequal treatment of nonmarital children, focusing 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law. 
** Vice Dean, Professor of Law and Chancellor’s Social Justice Scholar, Rutgers Law School. 
We thank Laura Appleman, Jack Chin, Courtney Joslin, Kevin Maillard, Solangel Maldonado, Melissa 
Murray, Shayak Sarkar, Donna Shestowsky, Brian Soucek, Deborah Widiss and participants of faculty 
workshops at Emory University Law School, Temple University Law School, UC Davis Law School 
and the Family Law Scholars and Teachers Workshop (2018) for their helpful comments and feedback 
to earlier versions of this Article. We are also grateful to Max Engel, Kelly McNaughton, Juan Pablo 
Sanchez, and Gretchen Smith for excellent research assistance. Finally, we thank the editors of the 
Washington University Law Review for their helpful substantive and editorial assistance.  











instead on how § 1409 discriminated on the basis of gender and effectively 
allowing this unconstitutional practice to continue.  
This Article calls attention to the prevalence of illegitimacy 
classifications in immigration law by identifying what we term “illegitimate 
citizenship rules.” In highlighting the pervasiveness of this form of 
discrimination, this Article makes three contributions. As a descriptive 
matter, these rules demonstrate the unfinished project within equal 
protection law of eviscerating discrimination against nonmarital children, 
which includes the treatment of such children in immigration law. As a 
doctrinal matter, the Article argues that the Supreme Court’s narrow focus 
on the sex equality dimension of § 1409 rendered invisible the 
discrimination against nonmarital children. Finally, as the Article makes 
clear, by discriminating against nonmarital children, illegitimate 
citizenship rules promote and perpetuate the “traditional” family and thus 
discriminate against those families that do not comport with the 
heterosexual marital family model. The Article concludes by recommending 
that Congress seize the opportunity created by Morales-Santana to address 
and eventually eradicate the ongoing discrimination against nonmarital 
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“[S]tunningly anachronistic.”1 This is how the Supreme Court in 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana described a derivative citizenship law that, for 
more than half a century, explicitly discriminated on the basis of gender.2 
Derivative citizenship law, codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), imposes certain 
physical presence requirements that parents must satisfy in order to transmit 
U.S. citizenship to their children who are born abroad.3 Married couples and 
unwed U.S. citizen fathers need to establish that they had ten years’ physical 
presence in the United States prior to their child’s birth.4 Unmarried U.S. 
citizen mothers, however, merely had to establish one year of continuous 
physical presence.5 Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
explained that such preferential treatment violated the right of “all persons 
[to] ‘the equal protection of the laws.’”6 Noting that the different physical 
presence requirements for unwed fathers and mothers were grounded in 
stereotypes,7 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the distinction “date[s] from an era 
when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations 
about the way men and women are.”8 Applying intermediate scrutiny, the 
Court ruled that the “gender line” that Congress drew is incompatible with 
the Constitution.9 Unsurprisingly, commentators described Morales-
Santana as a “landmark case”10 and a “groundbreaking victory for gender 
equality.”11  
At the same time, many have expressed disappointment with the Court 
for its refusal to provide a remedy that would have conferred citizenship on 
the Petitioner, Luis Ramón Morales-Santana.12 Indeed, others commented 
 
1. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017). 
2. Id. at 1690–92.  
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1958 ed.). As the Court pointed out, the current version of this law is 
now 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018). Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1686.  
4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (establishing physical presence requirements for married couples); 
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (providing physical presence requirements for unmarried U.S. citizen fathers).  
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).  
6. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1686.  
7. Id. at 1695 (such generalizations included the view that “unwed fathers care little about . . . 
their children”).  
8. Id. at 1689. 
9. Id. at 1687.  
10. Wesley Walker, Case Comment, Ginsburg Makes Strides Towards Gender Equality in 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, CUMB. L. REV. (July 4, 2017), https://cumberlandlawreview.com/2017/07/ 
04/ginsburg-makes-strides-towards-gender-equality-in-sessions-v-morales-santana/ [https://perma.cc/8 
AFN-ZGQJ]. 
11. Mark Joseph Stern, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Affirms the “Equal Dignity” of Mothers and 
Fathers, SLATE (June 13, 2017, 12:54 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprude 
nce/2017/06/sessions_v_morales_santana_ruth_bader_ginsburg_defends_gender_equality.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/8VNM-P6CQ].  
12. It should be noted that although many commentators agreed with the Court’s invalidation of 












on the potential of the Morales-Santana case to have an adverse impact on 
unwed mothers and their children.13  
Morales-Santana should be criticized for another reason. In examining 
the gender discrimination claim, the Court ignored a second distinct form 
of discrimination that also has lain within 8 U.S.C. § 1409 for more than 
half a century—discrimination on the basis of “illegitimacy.”14 Specifically, 
§ 1409(a)(4)(A) requires foreign-born nonmarital children to prove that 
they have been “legitimated” by their unwed fathers before they turn 
eighteen years old in order for them to prevail on their citizenship claims.15 
By contrast, foreign-born children in wedlock need not show these 
requirements, including that they have been legitimated. By virtue of their 
parents’ marriage, they are automatically and legally recognized as 
 
to grant the remedy that the Petitioner sought: to extend the benefit of the one-year physical presence 
requirement to his father, which by extension would mean that Petitioner acquired citizenship at birth. 
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Justice Ginsburg and the Price of Equality, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/opinion/ruth-bader-ginsburg-supreme-court.html [https:// 
perma.cc/W9SP-F8JU]; Tracy Thomas, SCOTUS Denial of Equal Protection Remedy Jeopardizes 
Equality Law: What Was Justice Ginsburg Thinking?, GENDER & L. PROF BLOG (June 13, 2017), http://l 
awprofessors.typepad.com/gender_law/2017/06/sctous-denial-of-equal-protection-remedy-jeopardizes 
-equality-law-what-was-justice-ginsburg-thinking.html [https://perma.cc/79SC-6V24]. Instead, the 
Court explained that it “is not equipped to grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks . . . .” Morales-Santana, 
137 S. Ct. at 1698. The Court noted that, in previous cases, it would extend the general rule to a 
disfavored class; however, in this case, the general rule—a longer physical presence requirement—
would cause a disadvantage to a favored class (unwed mothers) and would significantly disrupt a 
statutory scheme in which Congress expressed its preference for a longer physical presence requirement. 
Id. The Court’s remedy left in place a preference in favor of married U.S. citizen families, and one that 
disfavors nonmarital children. Id. 
13. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1697. Nevertheless, many have applauded the Court’s 
decision, calling it a “victory for gender equity.” Martha Davis, High Court Ruling on Birthright 
Citizenship Is a Victory for Gender Equity, BOS. GLOBE (June 13, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.boston 
globe.com/opinion/2017/06/12/high-court-ruling-birthright-citizenship-victory-for-gender-equity/NPZ 
1zGM1eU1d85TZmWWHCP/story.html [https://perma.cc/27KP-YBK4]. As one commentator 
quipped, “one of the most sexist federal laws currently on the books can no longer be enforced.” Stern, 
supra note 11. 
14. By discrimination on the basis of “illegitimacy,” we refer to government discrimination 
against a person on the basis of that person being born outside of marriage. Although we prefer to use 
the term “nonmarital” to refer to children whose parents are unmarried, we sometimes use the terms 
“illegitimate” and “illegitimacy” to explain statutory or judicial description or legal historical discussion 
of nonmarital children. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 n.11 (1977) (noting that between 
1968 and 1977, the Supreme Court considered twelve cases examining the constitutionality of “alleged 
discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy”). 
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)(A) (2018) (requiring a foreign-born non-citizen born out of 
wedlock to show that while she was under the age of eighteen years old she was “legitimated under the 
law of the person’s residence or domicile”). For a discussion of the process of “legitimation” in 
immigration law, see Laura Murray-Tjan, The Tragicomedy of Legitimation Jurisprudence After Watson 
v. Holder, 14-12 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2014). 
Section 1409 does allow parental acknowledgment of a child through paternity. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(a)(4)(B) (enabling a father to establish a filial relationship with the child through a number of 
methods, including the submission of results of a blood or DNA test). Moreover, § 1409(a) also requires 
the child to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a blood relationship between the child and 
father, see 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1), and that the father agreed in writing to provide financial support for 
the child until the age of eighteen years old. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3).  











“legitimate” children.16 These legitimation requirements have made it more 
difficult for foreign-born nonmarital children of U.S. citizen parents, 
specifically unwed fathers, to prove what should be regarded as their pre-
existing citizenship.17 In other words, just as § 1409 unfavorably treated 
unwed fathers, it also disfavored nonmarital children. Crucially, such 
disparate treatment of nonmarital children—illegitimacy discrimination—
is generally considered an equal protection violation.18 Despite this 
differential treatment, the Supreme Court in Morales-Santana failed to 
acknowledge this constitutionally infirm provision.19  
This Article calls attention to the prevalence of illegitimacy classification 
in immigration law by identifying what we term “illegitimate citizenship 
rules.” In highlighting the pervasiveness of this form of discrimination, this 
Article makes three contributions. First, as a descriptive matter, these rules 
demonstrate the unfinished project within equal protection law of 
eviscerating discrimination against nonmarital children. Since the 1960s, 
the Supreme Court has generally held that laws that distinguished between 
nonmarital and marital children violated the Equal Protection Clause.20 
Although not all forms of marital preferences that essentially discriminate 
against children of unwed parents are struck down, such illegitimacy 
discrimination, like gender, is considered a quasi-suspect classification for 
purposes of equal protection analysis and is thus reviewed under heightened 
scrutiny.21 Immigration law’s ongoing deployment of these illegitimate 
citizenship rules, and the Court’s uncritical examination of such laws, show 
that much work remains in ensuring equal treatment of children regardless 
of their parents’ marital status.  
Second, as a doctrinal matter, we analyze why the Supreme Court has 
elided this illegitimacy discrimination problem and argue that, ironically, 
the Court’s focus on the sex equality dimension of § 1409 is to blame. 
Revisiting the Court’s derivative citizenship cases—Miller v. Albright,22 
Nguyen v. INS,23 and Morales-Santana24—we contend that the Court’s 
emphasis on how § 1409 discriminated on the basis of gender rendered 
 
16. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (imposing certain requirements that children born out of 
wedlock must meet, including getting legitimated by their U.S. citizen fathers), with 8 U.S.C. § 1401 
(does not require legitimation), and 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (same).  
17. See infra Part II (examining the difficulties faced by foreign-born nonmarital children in 
proving their citizenship claims). 
18. See infra Part I. 
19. See infra notes 262–267 and accompanying text.  
20. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 
U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968); see also infra Part I.  
21. See infra Part I.A–C (explaining the development of the rights of nonmarital children under 
equal protection jurisprudence).  
22. 523 U.S. 420 (1998). 
23. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).  












invisible the discrimination against nonmarital children. Finally, as this 
Article makes clear, by discriminating against nonmarital children, 
illegitimate citizenship rules promote and perpetuate the “traditional” 
family and thus discriminate against those families that do not comport with 
the heterosexual marital family model.25  
The significant impact of these “illegitimate citizenship rules” should not 
go unnoticed. Millions of U.S. citizens who live abroad—to serve in the 
military, teach English, or work for the government and companies, among 
other reasons—must live by these rules.26 Although the government does 
not have accurate numbers of how many U.S. citizens live outside the 
United States, reports indicate that between 2.2 to 6.8 million U.S. citizens 
live abroad.27 Among these are U.S. military personnel. As of 2016, 
approximately 193,442 U.S. citizens are serving outside the United States.28 
These military personnel have historically engaged in sexual relations with 
non-citizens and many men have fathered children.29 Further, the Trump 
administration recently issued policy changes concerning the children of 
U.S. military personnel that created confusion regarding the conferral of 
citizenship to these children.30 Moreover, there have been a number of 
children born abroad through assisted reproductive technology (ART) and 
courts and the federal government have issued conflicting opinions on 
whether those children are U.S. citizens at birth.31 Doubtlessly, as more U.S. 
citizens have children born abroad, clarity regarding these citizenship rules 
is necessary.  
 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26.  Joe Costanzo & Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Counting the Uncountable: Overseas 
Americans, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 17, 2013), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/counting-
uncountable-overseas-americans [https://perma.cc/PAW7-ALW4] (explaining the various reasons why 
U.S. citizens live abroad). 
27. Id. (noting the absence of accurate records of U.S. citizens living abroad but estimating that 
between 2.2 to 6.8 million U.S. citizens are residing outside of the United States). 
28. Kristen Bialik, U.S. Active-Duty Military Presence Overseas Is at Its Smallest in Decades, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-mili 
tary-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades [https://perma.cc/PN5F-5VCF]. 
29. See Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629 
(2014); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction 
of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); M. Isabel Medina, Derivative Citizenship: 
What’s Marriage, Citizenship, Sex, Sexual Orientation, Race, and Class Got to Do With It?, 28 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 391 (2014). 
30. See Maria Sacchetti & Carol Morello, Trump Administration Clarifies Policy on Citizenship 




31. Compare Sarah Mervosh, Both Parents Are American. The U.S. Says Their Baby Isn’t., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2019, at A1, with Sarah Mervosh, Twins Were Born to a Gay Couple. Only One Child 
Was Recognized as a U.S. Citizen, Until Now., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2 
019/02/22/us/gay-couple-twin-sons-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/42WN-XHPA].  











The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I situates illegitimate citizenship 
rules within the broader development of equal protection rights for 
nonmarital children. As this Part explains, nonmarital children faced 
significant legal disadvantages under the common law. Beginning in the late 
1960s, however, courts began to invalidate discriminatory laws against 
them to recognize that they should not be punished for the sexual 
“misconduct” of their parents.32 In response to these developments, the 
federal and state governments revised statutes to eliminate discriminatory 
treatment of nonmarital children. Eventually, the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence developed in ways that accorded greater protection 
for the rights of nonmarital children. Specifically, the Court provided that 
illegitimacy discrimination would be subjected to intermediate scrutiny.33 
Treated as a quasi-suspect class, a law that discriminates on the basis of 
“illegitimacy” must further important government interests and be 
substantially related to such interests.34 Yet, as this Part explains, not all 
classifications based on a parent’s nonmarital status are unconstitutional, 
leaving in place some statutes that arguably discriminate against nonmarital 
children.  
With the proper legal framework regarding the rights of nonmarital 
children established, Part II analyzes the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) and its differential treatment of foreign-born nonmarital and marital 
children in the acquisition of citizenship from U.S. citizen parents. Although 
Congress in 1986 sought to treat children born out of wedlock the same as 
those born within marriage, it reinstated laws a few years later that revived 
the discriminatory treatment of nonmarital children.35 Specifically, the INA 
today, as embodied in § 1409, requires nonmarital children to prove that 
their fathers have “legitimated” them in order for these children to acquire 
U.S. citizenship from their fathers.36 Children born in wedlock, by contrast, 
are not subjected to these rules. The differential treatment of these 
nonmarital children in immigration and citizenship law, this Part maintains, 
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under conventional constitutional 
analysis. Instead, these illegitimate citizenship rules largely remain 
unaddressed.37  
 
32. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 347, 350–57 (2012) (explaining that the legal construct of illegitimacy “operated as a means 
of regulating sex” and that beginning in 1968, the Supreme Court began to view such laws as “illogical 
and unjust” because they penalize children for the “sexual transgressions of their parents”). 
33. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
34. See id. 
35. See infra Part II.D. 
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2018). 












Next, Part III examines why the federal government has continued to use 
illegitimate citizenship rules despite the development of equal protection 
laws that protect nonmarital children. Indeed, this Part points out that such 
rules have even come before the Supreme Court several times.38 The 
problem, as this Part contends, is that the Supreme Court has a narrow view 
of the discriminatory nature of derivative citizenship law. Specifically, the 
Supreme Court, for years, has framed the problem along a sex equality 
framework.39 Revisiting the key derivative citizenship cases—Miller v. 
Albright, Nguyen v. INS, and Morales-Santana—we demonstrate how the 
Court’s focus on gender discrimination rendered and continues to render 
illegitimacy discrimination invisible.  
Lastly, Part IV argues that these illegitimate citizenship rules not only 
impose harms on nonmarital children, but they also result in promoting and 
perpetuating the “traditional” family. Thus, the rules discriminate against 
those families that do not comport with the heterosexual marital family 
model. As such, this Part prescribes that Congress should seize the 
opportunity created in Morales-Santana to address and eventually eradicate 
the ongoing discrimination against foreign nonmarital children who are 
claiming citizenship from their unwed fathers.  
I. THE RIGHTS OF NONMARITAL CHILDREN UNDER THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
Historically, nonmarital children faced legal and social discrimination, 
although over time, as this Part explains, their legal status improved as a 
result of caselaw.40 Moreover, the legal and social status of nonmarital 
children advanced further with states’ adoption of the Uniform Parentage 
Act,41 which mandated that all children have the same rights regardless of 
their parents’ marital status.42 Still, as legal scholars and commentators have 
noted, differential and discriminatory treatment against nonmarital children 
in the United States endures.43 The illegitimate citizenship rules that § 1409 
 
38. See infra Part III. 
39. See infra notes 262–267 and accompanying text. 
40. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 
U.S. 73 (1968). 
41. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1973). 
42. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the 
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 540 (1990) 
(stating that the Uniform Parentage Act was intended to “equalize the legal and social status of children 
born out of wedlock”). Related to the goal of equalizing the rights of marital and nonmarital children, 
the Uniform Parentage Act also sought to establish the legal relationship between children and their 
nonmarital fathers. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the 
Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2308 (2016). 
43. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 387, 389 (2012) (challenging the “progress narrative” that the law abandoned the common 











imposes on nonmarital children born abroad whose parents are U.S. citizens 
underscore the ongoing prevalence of illegitimacy discrimination today.  
Part A first discusses that, for centuries, children that were born out of 
wedlock encountered significant legal and social maltreatment. Reflecting 
law and society’s preference for marriage and the traditional family, the 
common law legally disadvantaged nonmarital children in various ways. 
The tide changed, however, beginning in the 1960s when the Supreme Court 
stepped in and held that the Equal Protection Clause proscribes invidious 
discrimination against nonmarital children. Part B explains that courts 
began to further protect the rights of nonmarital children by eliminating 
many of the legal distinctions between children born out of wedlock and 
those born within marriage. Lastly, Part C notes that, today, classifications 
on the basis of parents’ marital status are subjected to intermediate scrutiny. 
This scrutiny illuminates law’s recognition that illegitimacy discrimination 
is disfavored but that some distinctions grounded on parents’ marital status 
remain. Overall, this history of the development of equal protection for 
nonmarital children demonstrates the trajectory towards equality for all 
children regardless of whether they were born in or outside of marriage. 
Importantly, it provides valuable background for analyzing the scope of the 
constitutional question at issue of illegitimate citizenship rules discussed in 
the ensuing Parts.  
A. Equal Protection Rights of Nonmarital Children  
Under the common law, children who were born outside of marriage 
were stigmatized and faced significant legal disadvantages in comparison to 
children born within marriage.44 Unlike their counterparts, nonmarital 
children could not inherit property,45 recover loss from the wrongful death 
 
law’s treatment of illegitimacy and arguing that cases associated with this narrative were less about 
disfavoring illegitimacy and more about favoring marriage and marriage-like types of families); 
Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital 
Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 348 (2011) (contending that despite legal and social changes to the status 
of nonmarital children, a number of laws continue to discriminate against nonmarital children). Other 
scholars highlight new forms of illegitimacy discrimination. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 32, at 365–
67 (exploring the possibility of a “new illegitimacy” emerging from differences between children 
conceived through heterosexual intercourse and those conceived through assisted reproductive 
treatments); Katherine A. West, Denying a Class of Adopted Children Equal Protection, 53 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 963 (2013) (arguing that children of unmarried and same-sex couples adopted through 
interstate adoption agencies face discrimination because they do not enjoy the same rights and benefits 
that stem from birth certificates of adopted children by married couples). 
44. Murray, supra note 43, at 390 (stating that “children born out of wedlock were legally 
disfavored”). Under the common law, nonmarital children were called filius nullius, which meant “son 
of no one and the heir of no one.” Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 337, 337 (1962).  
45. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 n.11 (1977); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978); 












of a parent,46 obtain state benefits,47 acquire child support,48 or receive 
Social Security benefits,49 among other things. Courts justified the legal 
discrimination of nonmarital children based on morality and general welfare 
policies that were intended to promote marriage and discourage nonmarital 
births.50  
To address the discriminatory treatment of nonmarital children, states 
adopted different approaches. Some states passed statutes that enabled 
fathers to legitimate their nonmarital children by recognizing and 
acknowledging them as their children.51 Some states allowed for 
legitimation if the parents subsequently married.52 Some of these states 
required fathers to sign formal written recognition and acknowledgment of 
their children, which required the signature of a witness, whereas other 
states accepted written letters by fathers to their children as valid form of 
legitimation.53 Other states recognized nonmarital children as legitimated if 
their fathers, through their words or conduct, publicly acknowledged or 
recognized them as their own children.54 Once legitimated, these nonmarital 
children effectively obtained rights that they would have automatically 
enjoyed if they were born in wedlock.55 Put differently, unless legitimated, 
children who were born out of wedlock were legally inferior to marital 
children.56 This form of second-class citizenship continued well after the 
mid-twentieth century.57 
Change began in 1968. That year, the Supreme Court decided two cases, 
Levy v. Louisiana58 and a companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & 
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Liability Insurance Co.59 These cases led to a paradigm shift in the 
jurisprudence regarding the rights of nonmarital children seeking to remove 
legal distinctions based on whether their parents were married at the time of 
their birth.60 The Court, for the first time, addressed whether state 
discrimination against nonmarital children violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61  
In Levy, the Supreme Court examined whether the state’s denial of 
nonmarital children’s damages recovery for the death of their mother under 
the state’s wrongful death statute was constitutional.62 Although the Court 
acknowledged that legislatures have discretion to create classifications in 
order to further their “social and economic” policies, it held that such 
distinctions must not constitute “invidious discrimination against a 
particular class.”63 In this case, what was at stake, according to the Court, 
was the right involving the “intimate, familial relationship between a child 
and his own mother.”64 The child’s status bore no rational relation to the 
“wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother”65 and the child’s exclusion from 
the law based on nonmarital status constituted invidious discrimination.66 
In the companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability 
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court addressed a similar exclusion from the 
state’s wrongful death act, except this time, the claim was made by the 
mother for the wrongful death of her child born out of wedlock.67 Here, too, 
the Court held that the law engaged in unlawful discrimination.68 Noting 
that the state had previously applied the law inconsistently against 
nonmarital children and their parents, the Court concluded that the law did 
not have a rational basis.69 Although the Court recognized that the state 
sought to regulate a “sin,” 70 which according to the state allowed it to apply 
the wrongful death recovery law inconsistently, the Court nevertheless 
found that denying the mother the right to recover damages would not 
further the “cause of illegitimacy.”71 By holding that the discrimination 
against nonmarital children violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
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in both Levy and Glona inaugurated a fundamental shift in the treatment of 
children born out of wedlock.72 
B. Removing Legal Distinctions Between Nonmarital and Legitimated 
Children 
As noted above, Levy and Glona underscored the historical actions 
against nonmarital children as an “illogical and unjust” method of punishing 
parents through their children.73 Despite the strong declarations that law 
must not punish children born out of wedlock, the cases that followed Levy 
and Glona did not necessarily lead to equal treatment between nonmarital 
and marital children. In some cases, the children born out of wedlock 
prevailed against the government74 and, in some cases, they lost.75 For 
example, in Labine v. Vincent, the Court held that “acknowledged, but not 
legitimated, illegitimate children” may be excluded from inheriting property 
from their parents under the state’s intestacy laws.76 Distinguishing the right 
to inherit property, the issue in Labine, from the right to recover damages 
under tort law, the issue in Levy, the Court held that the state has the 
authority and discretion to pass intestacy statutes in order to “further 
strengthen and preserve family ties.”77 Notably, the Court stated that Levy 
did not issue a blanket ruling that “a State can never treat an illegitimate 
child differently from legitimate offspring.”78 
Yet, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibited the state from excluding 
unacknowledged nonmarital children from the definition of children under 
the state’s workers’ compensation law.79 The Court did not question the 
state’s right to enact laws that are designed to protect “legitimate family 
relationships” or the importance of protecting this interest.80 However, the 
Court noted that the issue centered on how the state law promoted such 
interests.81 In this case, the Court found that “the classification is justified 
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by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.”82 As the Court 
explained, “[n]or can it be thought here that persons will shun illicit 
relations because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of 
workmen’s compensation.”83  
As Labine and Weber make evident, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on the rights of nonmarital children is far from consistent. Nevertheless, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government and states relaxed their 
legitimation statutes to comport with the principle unrebutted in these 
cases—that nonmarital children should not be punished for the actions of 
their parents. Statutes that prevented nonmarital children from gaining 
rights given to marital and legitimated children were struck down.84  
Significantly, in 1973, several states adopted the Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA) which eliminated legitimation as the standard for recognizing the 
rights of nonmarital children.85 Instead, the UPA adopted the more relaxed 
process of paternity to establish the parent-child relationship. The UPA 
noted that “[t]he parent and child relationship extends equally to every child 
and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.”86 
Nineteen states adopted this definition in 1973, and other states adopted it 
soon after, abrogating the legal distinctions between children who were born 
in marriage and outside of marriage.87 The requirement of fathers having to 
legitimate their children disappeared, replaced by the more flexible process 
of paternity in the majority of states today.88  
C. Illegitimacy as a Quasi-Suspect Classification 
Today, classifications relating to illegitimacy are not per se 
unconstitutional. Rather, courts have subjected classifications to a higher 
level of scrutiny and inquire whether there is a substantial relationship 
between the classification and a legitimate state interest.89 Thus, the Court 
in Lalli v. Lalli upheld the exclusion of a nonmarital child from receiving 
an intestate share of the father’s estate because the child did not obtain an 
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order of paternity during the father’s lifetime.90 Notably, it explained that 
the state had a substantial interest in ensuring a “just and orderly disposition 
of property at death” and that the means adopted here—requiring the 
establishment of paternity while the father is still alive—is substantially 
related to the interest.91 Of particular importance is the Court’s emphasis on 
New York’s liberalization of its intestacy statute, recognizing that it has 
“soften[ed] the rigors of previous law which permitted illegitimate children 
to inherit only from their mothers”92 and granted nonmarital children “in so 
far as practicable rights of inheritance on a par with those enjoyed by 
legitimate children.”93 Thus, despite holding against a nonmarital child, the 
Court’s decision was based on an inquiry into the state’s legitimate interests 
and whether it substantially related to the state’s interest while also 
recognizing that nonmarital children should enjoy rights that marital 
children enjoy.  
In sum, gone are the days where nonmarital children, referred to as filius 
nullius or child of no one,94 may be absolutely barred from rights 
traditionally conferred to children born in wedlock. Courts have held that 
laws that distinguish the rights of children on the basis of their parents’ 
marital status for the purposes of promoting marriage may constitute 
invidious discrimination.95 As such, “illegitimacy” is treated as a quasi-
suspect classification that is distinct from whether the law also discriminates 
on the basis of gender.96 In other words, discrimination against nonmarital 
children receives special scrutiny. As the Court explained in Weber, “no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an 
ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”97  
At the same time, states may continue to impose classifications that 
relate to illegitimacy as long as they are not overly burdensome or 
insurmountable, and they can show that there is a substantial relationship 
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between a given law that treats nonmarital children differently from marital 
children and the state’s legitimate interest.98 
As the next Part explains, however, the constitutional protections 
accorded to nonmarital children from the foregoing cases have had little 
impact in the context of citizenship and immigration law. 
II. NONMARITAL CHILDREN AND LEGITIMATION RULES IN CITIZENSHIP 
LAW 
In this Part, this Article explores derivative citizenship laws and analyzes 
the extent to which they depart from the constitutional mandate of equal 
treatment of all children regardless of their parents’ marital status. To begin 
to do so, consider the following scenario. Both Anna and Barbara were born 
in the Philippines on February 4, 1972. Anna’s parents, Adam and Abby, 
are married and both are U.S. citizens. Under citizenship rules in effect in 
1972, Anna acquired citizenship at birth if she can show that one of her 
parents resided (for any period of time) in the United States before she was 
born.99 Barbara’s parents, Bob and Beth, by contrast, are not married and 
only one (Bob) is a U.S. citizen. For this unmarried couple, citizenship law 
imposes stricter requirements. At the outset, their child Barbara must show 
that Bob resided in the United States for at least five years.100 Barbara must 
also demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence her blood relationship 
to her unwed father, Bob, and that he agreed in writing to provide her 
financial support until she reaches the age of eighteen years old.101 
Critically, she must show that her father legitimated her by acknowledging 
paternity in writing under oath or established paternity in a court of law.102 
By contrast, Anna does not have to establish the ongoing parental bond—
her parents’ marriage presumes her validity as the child of a U.S. citizen and 
paves an easier path to obtaining citizenship.  
The foregoing examples demonstrate the critical role that marriage plays 
in a child’s ability to prove her entitlement to citizenship. As explained in 
this Part, derivative citizenship law underwent various legislative changes 
to determine how children born out of wedlock could acquire citizenship. 
Part A first explains the two provisions within the Immigration and 
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Nationality Act (INA) that govern the conferral of citizenship from a parent 
to a child. Next, Part B examines the trajectory of legitimation and the 
treatment of nonmarital children in the INA,103 and demonstrates a set of 
rules that clearly favor marital over nonmarital children when it comes to 
derivative citizenship.104 Although Congress at one point sought to rid the 
statute of unequal treatment of nonmarital children, the INA continues to 
impose requirements that go beyond the paternity acknowledgment that 
suffices to establish a family bond under the UPA.  
A. Proving Citizenship for Nonmarital Children in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act 
Nonmarital children born in the United States are treated the same as 
marital children because of the principle of jus soli in the Act. Anyone born 
in or outside of marriage in the United States is automatically a U.S. 
citizen.105 Marriage, in other words, is irrelevant to a claim of citizenship 
under the principles of jus soli. Marriage, however, becomes relevant when 
a child is born outside the United States. Today, two sections of the INA are 
implicated in the determination of citizenship for children born abroad. 
First, a general provision requires a citizen parent to show five years of 
physical presence in the United States before a child is born abroad to the 
citizen and a noncitizen parent.106 A second provision applies if the child 
born abroad is born outside of marriage, requiring nonmarital children to 
demonstrate either proof of paternity or legitimation, plus a commitment 
from the nonmarital father of financial support until the child turns 
eighteen.107 Before Congressional amendment in 1986, the provision was 
even more restrictive. It allowed nonmarital children to acquire citizenship 
only if their U.S. citizen fathers legitimated them.108 The provision focused 
on legitimation rather than simply the establishment of the parent-child 
relationship because of long-held family law doctrine denying equal status 
 
103. Id. §§ 1401(a), 1409(a).  
104. See id. §§ 1401(a), 1409(a). 
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).  
107. Id. § 1409(a).  
108. No such requirement existed for unmarried mothers. Kristin Collins describes how the 
legitimation requirement itself was a creation of administrative authorities and their interpretation of the 
statute before it became an explicit statutory requirement. Kristin A. Collins, Bureaucracy as the Border: 
Administrative Law and the Citizen Family, 66 DUKE L.J. 1727, 1737–38 (2017); see also Citizenship–
Children Born Abroad Out of Wedlock of Am. Fathers and Alien Mothers, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 162, 164 
(1920). The administrative agencies eventually pushed for legislative ratification of this policy by 
drafting the legitimation requirement that was implemented in the Nationality Act of 1940. Nationality 
Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, ch. 876, §§ 201(g), 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1139–40; see also Collins, 
supra, at 1744. 











to nonmarital children.109 The immigration statute reflected the general 
attitudes found in other laws governing the rights of nonmarital children 
until the 1970s, when state laws began to adopt the UPA. Congress has 
failed to catch up with the evolution of the rights of nonmarital children 
since the 1970s, however. The following sections trace how the Bureau of 
Immigration Naturalization, tasked with making decisions about derivative 
citizenship, and the statute have historically treated nonmarital children.  
B. Pre-1952: Enforcing Legitimation Rules in the Face of Congressional 
Silence 
The first derivative citizenship law, which was passed in 1790, provided 
that the “children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond 
sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural 
born citizens.”110 As these words evidence, the statute did not expressly 
require that a child born out of wedlock satisfy additional prerequisites in 
order to obtain citizenship. Indeed, the 1940 Immigration Act, which 
provides the foundation for modern derivative citizenship, similarly said 
nothing about the relationship between marriage and derivative citizenship. 
Yet, although the immigration statute itself was silent on the treatment of 
nonmarital children before 1940, agency interpretation of the derivative 
citizenship provisions was institutionalized during the period through 
opinion letters and guidance on the treatment of nonmarital children of 
citizen fathers.111 The law at the time stated:  
All children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United 
States, whose fathers may be at the time of their birth citizens of the 
United States, are declared to be citizens of the United States.112 
Although the language of the statute said nothing about fathers being 
married, the agency interpreted the law to require fathers to legitimate 
children born outside of marriage. Specifically, adjudicators sought 
evidence of legitimation in cases where nonmarital children sought 
citizenship through their U.S. citizen fathers. Take the case of Mr. and Mrs. 
Frank Wagner, who sought an opinion on their citizenship status in 1933.113 
Mrs. Wagner was a U.S. citizen at the time she married Frank Wagner, who 
was born in Europe.114 Under the law at the time, Mrs. Wagner’s citizenship 
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followed that of her husband’s when she married.115 Mrs. Wagner’s attorney 
sought an opinion on whether Mr. Wagner had derived U.S. citizenship 
from his U.S.-born father.116 Frank was the child of a foreign-born mother 
and a U.S. citizen father who were not married. The Wagners’ attorney 
argued that Congress was silent on the issue of illegitimacy.117  
The Wagners’ attorney argued that because the statute was silent as to 
legitimacy, establishment of paternity should suffice to establish 
citizenship.118 The agency responded with a two-pronged interpretation of 
the statute. First, it argued that the citizenship of a nonmarital child follows 
the citizenship of the mother.119 Second, if a child were legitimated under 
the laws of the father’s domicile the agency could award benefits to the 
child, including citizenship.120  
The agency cited two cases to support its position that Congress did not 
intend to extend citizenship rights to nonmarital children of citizen 
fathers.121 In Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin,122 a child of a U.S. citizen father and a 
second wife in a polygamous marriage claimed her father’s citizenship. The 
circuit court refused to recognize the second marriage, thereby classifying 
the child as nonmarital.123 Despite the silence of Congress on the issue, the 
court noted that “we are far from convinced that Congress intended to confer 
the right of citizenship on illegitimate children born abroad, or upon the 
offspring of polygamous marriages.”124 The court opined that the child bore 
the consequences of “intercourse between persons of opposite sex [that] was 
illicit in its inception, because of their failure to enter into a marriage by 
ceremony or by agreement.”125 It then placed the burden on the child to 
show a subsequent legitimation.  
In Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast,126 Suey claimed derivative 
citizenship as a child of a U.S. citizen born abroad. Suey’s U.S. citizen 
father, Chin Ming, was married to two wives, one of whom died.127 Suey 
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was the offspring of the second marriage.128 Suey argued that he was 
legitimated when the first wife died, and his mother became the first wife.129 
The court disagreed, noting that the offspring of a secondary wife of a 
polygamous marriage is not recognized as legitimated simply because the 
first wife dies.130 The court noted that the statute applies to legitimate 
children only and is silent about the process of legitimation, so even if the 
child were legitimated, he would still not have been a citizen at birth.131 In 
both of these cases, the agency used the publicly sanctioned aversion to 
polygamy to refuse citizenship to nonmarital children in general.  
The addition of a legitimation requirement at the administrative level 
may have been an attempt to reflect public attitudes surrounding the status 
of nonmarital children at the time. The agency had a choice, however. At 
the time, several states had paternity acknowledgment laws that would have 
served the same purpose, and some states essentially treated children born 
out of wedlock as “legitimate.”132 The agency chose the most restrictive 
option in the face of congressional silence: without legitimation, nonmarital 
children could not obtain derivative citizenship. 
As Congress considered passage of the 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act, the agency sought to institutionalize the legitimation 
requirement it had read into the statute.133 A committee consisting of the 
heads of the departments of Labor, Justice, and State proposed the statutory 
language requiring legitimation (or an adjudicative process) before a citizen 
father could transfer citizenship to a nonmarital child.134 The 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act added the legitimation requirement. It 
specified that only a legitimation occurring under the laws of the citizen 
father’s domicile would suffice for immigration purposes.135 By this time, 
the immigration agency had developed another rationale not just for a 
legitimation requirement, but also for its narrow construction: fraud.136 No 
longer was the legitimation requirement a substitute for paternity 
acknowledgment. It became the only method by which the federal 
government could avoid fraud in the case of fathers and their nonmarital 
children. This rationale became the predominant reason for a formal 
legitimation requirement, and its power remains today. Ultimately, the 
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immigration agency succeeded in interpreting the legitimation provision 
narrowly. It required that to be a valid legitimation for immigration 
purposes, a state paternity acknowledgment or legitimation law had to bring 
a nonmarital child into parity with a marital child.137 This meant that even 
though the child may have been legitimated under a valid state legal process, 
the legitimation was not sufficient for immigration law purposes if it did not 
bring the nonmarital child into parity with the marital child. This was 
problematic in the many instances in which, for example, only marriage 
would allow the nonmarital child to achieve parity with the marital child. 
Parents who could not marry for whatever reason were left without a remedy 
under the immigration statute.138 Importantly, neither the legitimation 
requirement, nor an equivalent, existed for the children of unmarried 
mothers or for marital children.139 
C. Equal Protection Challenges to Legitimation Rules and Congressional 
Advocacy: 1952–1986 
Soon after Congress incorporated the legitimation requirement into the 
immigration statute, advocates began to challenge the general state laws that 
punished nonmarital children based on their status. As discussed supra, 
several cases challenged the differential treatment of children born out of 
wedlock on equal protection grounds.140 In these cases, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly struck down the distinctions between children born within 
marriage and those children born outside of marriage. The Court held in 
these cases that nonmarital children should not suffer the consequences of 
their parents’ sins and, importantly, their status was not deserving of 
unequal treatment.141  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been more equivocal in its 
treatment of nonmarital children in the immigration context. In immigration 
law, the Supreme Court allowed the legitimation requirement to stand in 
several cases, demonstrating its preference for plenary power principles 
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over anti-discrimination principles in the immigration arena. In Fiallo v. 
Bell,142 for example, the Supreme Court upheld an immigration provision 
that conferred family preference immigration status to marital children and 
to the nonmarital children of mothers but not fathers.143 The plaintiffs 
challenged the definition of child in the statute, which, at the time, included 
the children of unmarried mothers, but not the children of unmarried fathers. 
The litigants claimed the statute discriminated “on the basis of the father’s 
marital status, the illegitimacy of the child and the sex of the parent without 
either compelling or rational justification.”144 They also claimed that the 
statute’s assumption that no relationship existed between a father and his 
nonmarital child denied them due process because it was “an unwarranted 
conclusive presumption of the absence of strong psychological and 
economic ties between natural fathers and their children born out of 
wedlock and not legitimated.”145 Finally, they claimed the statute’s failure 
to recognize the relationship between fathers and their nonmarital children 
“seriously burden[ed] and infringe[d] upon the rights of natural fathers and 
their children, born out of wedlock and not legitimated, to mutual 
association, to privacy, to establish a home, to raise natural children and to 
be raised by the natural father.”146 Rather than confronting the 
discrimination head-on, the Court held that Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration gave it the authority to impose gender and legitimacy-based 
distinctions when it conferred immigration benefits.147  
Nonetheless, judicial concern over the treatment of nonmarital children 
in general spilled over into legislative discussions surrounding immigration 
law in the 1970s and 1980s. Several amendments were proposed as part of 
comprehensive immigration reform proposals during that period.148 
Proposed changes to the child definition would put nonmarital children on 
the same footing as children born within a marriage for immigration benefits 
and citizenship. It was not until 1986, however, that the concerns over equal 
treatment of nonmarital children resulted in amendments to both the child 
definition in the statute, and the derivation of citizenship for nonmarital 
children.149 
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D. The 1986 Amendments to the Legitimation Rules in Immigration Law 
and the 1988 Technical Corrections 
In 1986, Congress loosened the legitimation requirement by allowing for 
the establishment of paternity by alternative means.150 Mirroring state 
litigation over differential treatment of nonmarital children, the debates 
leading up to the 1986 amendments centered on whether the gender 
disparities in the statute were sufficiently related to a legitimate purpose.151 
They resulted from several years of advocacy by those who sought to 
eliminate illegitimacy-based discrimination.152 Legislators seeking to 
remove the disparities between nonmarital and marital children in the law, 
in general, were at the forefront of immigration reform legislation.153 
Progressive legislators, including Elizabeth Holtzman, chair of the House 
Immigration Subcommittee, targeted the gender-based differences in 
immigration law, including the legitimation requirements in citizenship law, 
as sexist. In the 1970s, Representative Holtzman introduced a bill that 
would “bring section 101(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act into 
accord with our constitutional prohibitions against discrimination based on 
sex.”154 She also noted the discrimination based on nonmarital child status, 
observing that “[a]s the courts have held in many circumstances, it is no less 
important for a ‘child’ to be cared for by its parent when that parent is male 
rather than female.”155 The advocacy of Representative Holtzman and like-
minded representatives no doubt brought about the 1986 changes expanding 
the paternity acknowledgment options for nonmarital fathers in the 
citizenship acquisition provisions. Still, the proposed changes centered on 
differences between unmarried mothers and fathers, rather than on 
differences made in the statute between marital and nonmarital children. 
Ultimately, Congress did not completely eliminate the legitimation 
requirement. It remains in the statute as one of the options available for 
proving the parent-child relationship.156 The legitimation option comports 
with the State Department’s anti-fraud position because it requires a state 
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court action to adjudicate paternity.157 Moreover, Congress imposed a 
requirement of financial support for the nonmarital child, thereby 
incorporating the agency rule that paternity acknowledgment must bring the 
nonmarital child into parity with the marital child, at least with respect to 
child support.158  
Congress did, it seems, address the potential unconstitutionality of 
distinctions between marital and nonmarital children by making the 1986 
amendment retroactive. In contrast to other citizenship provisions, 
including the previous version of the legitimation provision that became 
effective prospectively, the 1986 amendment eliminated the words, “on or 
after the effective date of this act.”159 Instead, the amended provision 
applied “at the time of the child’s birth” to a person born out of wedlock.160 
Thus, a nonmarital child born before the alternative means of proving the 
parent-child relationship were implemented in 1986 could now use those 
alternative means to establish the relationship. In so doing, the 1986 
amendment reflected the purpose of the drafters to remove the stigma of 
illegitimacy from the statutory provision for all nonmarital children.161 It 
also comported with the trend in the states to eliminate distinctions between 
nonmarital and marital children.162 Congress had essentially given a father 
several options in addition to legitimation for establishing paternity no 
matter when the child was born.  
The 1986 amendment, as originally written, however, was short-lived. It 
was amended again through technical amendments in 1988.163 The 
amendment added an effective date to the provision—“persons born on or 
after November 14, 1986.”164 The old § 1409(a) provision still applies to 
anyone who was already eighteen years old as of the date of the Act.165 The 
technical amendment had the effect of making the statute prospective, thus 
preventing those individuals who turned eighteen before 1986 from 
establishing paternity by alternative means.166 For these nonmarital 
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children, the only means of establishing their filial tie is through 
legitimation.  
By contrast, to this day, the children of married parents obtain citizenship 
without any further proof of a filial bond. The history of the legitimation 
provision demonstrates unease with nonmarital children and their 
undeserving status in citizenship decisions. Throughout this period, 
marriage did the work of ensuring that only the proper, or deserving, 
children born outside the United States became citizens. As a result, both 
the legitimation and the physical presence requirements served as the 
government’s proxies for citizenship. Marriage bestowed a presumption of 
both familial ties and loyalty to the United States.167  
III. DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP CASES: SEX EQUALITY OVER ILLEGITIMACY 
DISCRIMINATION 
The previous Parts highlighted an apparent disconnect between the 
protections accorded to nonmarital children under conventional equal 
protection jurisprudence and the current treatment of foreign-born 
nonmarital children of U.S. citizen fathers. Part I explained that today, equal 
protection principles have sought to do away with the differential treatment 
of nonmarital children, particularly where the law seeks to punish a child in 
order to promote marital preference. Under this approach, courts analyze 
whether the legal distinction being imposed on the nonmarital child is 
substantially related to an important government interest.168 This searching 
scrutiny would allow courts to strike down the disparate treatment of 
children born out of wedlock if it finds that the law punishes children on the 
basis of their parents’ unwed status.169 Yet, as Part II discussed, derivative 
citizenship law continues to make distinctions between nonmarital and 
marital children in their ability to acquire citizenship from their parents. 
While children of married U.S. citizens easily acquire citizenship, children 
of unmarried fathers where at least one person is a U.S. citizen have a 
significantly more difficult time proving citizenship.  
In this Part, we critically analyze why the federal government has 
continued to use illegitimate citizenship rules. In particular, we contend that 
the recurring differential treatment of nonmarital children born abroad can 
best be understood as the issue of “illegitimacy discrimination” taking a 
back seat to gender discrimination. That is, it is not that the Supreme Court 
has not been aware of these illegitimacy citizenship rules. Specifically, the 
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Supreme Court in three cases—Miller v. Albright,170 Nguyen v. INS,171 and 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana172—addressed the constitutionality of the 
disparate rules imposed on nonmarital children’s abilities to derive 
citizenship from their unwed fathers. However, the Court analyzed 
derivative citizenship rules mainly from the perspective of the effect of the 
laws on the unwed U.S. citizen father. The rights of the nonmarital child, by 
contrast, were left unaddressed. We argue that although addressing the 
discriminatory treatment based on gender was important, the Court should 
have also taken into account how the rules perpetuated illegitimacy 
discrimination. 
To demonstrate the Court’s neglect of the impact of illegitimate 
citizenship rules on nonmarital children, this Part revisits the forgoing 
Supreme Court cases. In retelling the cases from the nonmarital child’s 
perspective, this Part illuminates how the Court’s framing of derivative 
citizenship law on sex equality grounds rendered illegitimacy 
discrimination invisible. As our narrative of the cases argues, the Court’s 
rejection of the constitutional harm to unwed fathers in Miller and Nguyen 
ignores the ways in which derivative citizenship law imposed more 
burdensome requirements for nonmarital children to prove their citizenship. 
By focusing on the impact of derivative citizenship law on nonmarital 
children, we reveal two key animating principles embedded in the Court’s 
analyses—the extent to which derivative citizenship laws not only penalize 
nonmarital children but also privilege marriage and heteronormative, dual 
U.S. citizen families. Notably, although the Court in Morales-Santana 
ensured that at least one provision of the derivative citizenship law—the 
different physical presence requirements for unwed fathers and unwed 
mothers—could no longer stand because it discriminated against unwed 
fathers,173 it left in place the disparate treatment of nonmarital children. 
Again, this harm to children born out of wedlock could have been addressed 
had the Court taken into account both the gender and illegitimacy 
discrimination animating the illegitimate citizenship rules.   
A. Miller v. Albright 
Miller v. Albright174 is generally known as the first time the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of gender discrimination in the context of 
derivative citizenship.175 It therefore established the legal landscape for the 
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ensuing cases and, accordingly, this Part spends considerable time 
examining the case. Miller actually began as a case brought by Lorelyn 
Miller (Lorelyn), the child of an unwed U.S. citizen man, Charlie Miller 
(Charlie), who argued that she was being discriminated against on the basis 
of her status as an “illegitimate” child.176 The facts depict a story of a parent-
child relationship that developed later in the child’s life but nonetheless 
shows significant familial bonds. Lorelyn was born out of wedlock on June 
20, 1970, in the Philippines to Luz Peñero, a Philippine national, and 
Charlie, a U.S. citizen who was a serving in the United States Air Force and 
stationed in the Philippines when Lorelyn was conceived.177 As her parents 
were not married, Lorelyn’s mother registered her birth as “illegitimate,” 
leaving the space for her father blank.178  
Lorelyn’s parents never married and Lorelyn, growing up in the 
Philippines while her father was in the United States, did not have a 
“parental relationship” with Charlie.179 However, the two eventually began 
exchanging letters and communicating with each other.180 Lorelyn also 
communicated regularly with her paternal grandmother.181 When Lorelyn’s 
grandmother died, Charlie and Lorelyn had more frequent direct 
communication with each other.182 In other words, although the two might 
not have had a parental relationship in the beginning of Lorelyn’s life, they 
eventually developed a parent-child bond. Charlie thought of Lorelyn as his 
daughter (albeit located thousands of miles away) and she looked to him as 
her father.  
As a father, Charlie ultimately wanted to bring his daughter, Lorelyn, to 
the United States. Because Charlie is a U.S. citizen, he contended that 
Lorelyn acquired citizenship at birth, which meant that she had the right to 
enter the United States.183 He therefore sought to obtain paperwork to 
establish their parent-child relationship. Shortly after Lorelyn turned 
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twenty-one, Charlie sought and was granted a voluntary paternity decree 
from a Texas court recognizing him as Lorelyn’s legal father.184 With the 
decree in hand, Lorelyn subsequently applied for a passport.185 The state’s 
legal recognition of Charlie as Lorelyn’s father, however, was insufficient 
to confer citizenship on Lorelyn.186 As discussed in Part II, under 
illegitimate citizenship rules, Charlie, as her unwed father, needed to either 
legitimate Lorelyn before she turned twenty-one, or acknowledge his 
paternity before Lorelyn turned eighteen years old, as well as agree in 
writing to provide financial support until she turned eighteen years old.187  
Neither Charlie nor Lorelyn, however, knew about these requirements. 
Unfortunately, Charlie acknowledged his paternity for purposes of 
conferring his citizenship too late—after she had already turned twenty-
one.188 Thus, when Lorelyn went to the State Department to apply for a U.S. 
passport, her application was denied.189 Believing that the statute 
discriminated against nonmarital children in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Lorelyn sued.190 In particular, Lorelyn contended that the 
statute’s distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children 
violated equal protection principles as applied to the federal government.191  
The procedural history of the case reveals the complexity of 
discrimination in derivative citizenship. The district court dismissed the 
case, holding that the court lacked power to grant her the remedy she 
sought—citizenship.192 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed the lower court, however, at least with respect to 
its conclusion that it lacked the power to convey a remedy.193 In particular, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the lower court was mistaken in that the plaintiff 
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did not ask the court to grant her citizenship; instead, Lorelyn asked the 
court to declare a statute unconstitutional.194  
However, the D.C. Circuit disagreed with Lorelyn’s equal protection 
claim. At the outset, the D.C. Circuit recognized that the “burdens imposed 
upon illegitimate children are greater than those imposed upon legitimate 
children.”195 In particular, the D.C. Circuit noted that under 8 U.S.C. § 
1401(g), every legitimate child who is born outside the United States 
acquires citizenship if their marital parents are U.S. citizens or one of the 
marital parents is a U.S. citizen who satisfies certain residency 
requirements.196 By contrast, that statute does not apply to a child with bi-
national parents (one U.S. citizen and one non-citizen parent) who are 
unmarried.197 In other words, the statute by design privileges those children 
whose parents are married.  
Despite the court’s recognition of the differential treatment of nonmarital 
children, the D.C. Circuit shifted its analysis on gender lines. Specifically, 
it concluded that requiring unwed fathers, but not unwed mothers, to 
legitimate their children was justified in fostering the child’s ties to both the 
United States and her U.S. citizen father.198 Thus, instead of analyzing 
whether § 1409 discriminated against nonmarital children in the first 
instance, the court examined it instead as a form of gender discrimination.  
Notably, illustrating the court’s deferential approach to the federal 
government where immigration and citizenship laws are concerned,199 the 
D.C. Circuit applied rational basis review and held that “‘a desire to promote 
early ties to this country and to those relatives who are citizens of this 
country is not a[n ir]rational basis for the requirements made by’ sections 
1409(a)(3) and (4).”200 The court further commented that it was “entirely 
reasonable for Congress to require special evidence of such ties between an 
illegitimate child and its father” since a “mother is far less likely to ignore 
the child she has carried in her womb” than the “natural father, who may 
not even be aware of its existence.”201 Here, the language illuminates the 
sex equality framing of the court’s analysis. Emphasizing the court’s 
approach along gender lines, it noted that “mothers and fathers of 
illegitimate children are not similarly situated.”202 The father may be 
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“unconscious of the birth of the child” and even if conscious, he would be 
unconcerned “because of the absence of any ties to the mother.”203  
Today, under Morales-Santana, such language would constitute 
unlawful gender stereotyping that would reasonably lead to both 
§ 1409(a)(3) and (4) getting struck down.204 At the time, however, this 
language was reflective of the rationale that upheld differential treatment of 
unwed fathers and unwed mothers. The opinion is also worth noting for 
another reason—it illustrates how the D.C. Circuit missed the opportunity 
to see how § 1409(a)(3) and (4) also discriminated on the basis of Lorelyn’s 
status as a nonmarital child who, unlike children of U.S. citizens born in 
marriage, must show that her father legitimated her. The court could have 
examined why nonmarital children ex ante must overcome barriers that are 
not imposed on marital children, who are automatically considered 
“legitimate” because their parents are married. 
Lorelyn’s illegitimacy discrimination continued to take a back seat when 
her case was heard by the Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the distinction in § 1409 between “‘illegitimate’ 
children” of U.S. citizen mothers and “‘illegitimate’ children” of U.S. 
citizen fathers violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.205 Thus, 
like the court below, the Supreme Court ultimately focused on whether the 
differences in § 1409(a)(4)’s treatment of nonmarital mothers and fathers in 
its derivative citizenship rules amounted to gender discrimination and 
marginalized the illegitimacy discrimination issue that was also at the heart 
of Lorelyn’s claim. 
Producing five opinions, the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion honed in 
on gender discrimination in coming to its conclusion that § 1409(a)(4) was 
constitutional, holding that “[t]he biological differences between single men 
and single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing 
their ability to confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands.”206 As 
this conclusion evidences, the Court’s analysis centered on presumed 
gender differences in parental responsibilities. Specifically, the Court noted 
that far more severe burdens are imposed on unwed mothers (including 
carrying the pregnancy to term and giving birth to the child) than unwed 
fathers, who do not even need to be present at birth.207 Finding unpersuasive 
the claim that such differential burdens are the product of “overbroad 
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stereotypes,” the Court emphasized that § 1409(a)(4) ensures that the 
nonmarital child shares a blood relationship with a U.S. citizen and that 
requiring reliable proof of this biological relationship is an important 
government interest.208 While the blood relationship between a mother and 
child is patently obvious at birth, the relationship between a father and child, 
according to the Court, may be undisclosed and unrecorded.209 It is thus 
rational to require a father to produce evidence within eighteen years of the 
child’s life that substantiates his biological relationship to the child.210 
Further, the Court explained that Congress could have concluded that either 
a written acknowledgment (legitimation) or a court adjudication of paternity 
along a clear and convincing evidence standard was necessary to deter 
fraud.211  
Crucially, the Court noted that § 1409(a)(4) also promotes interests that 
are unrelated to paternity: fostering the relationship between a parent and a 
minor and the “ties between the foreign-born child and the United States.”212 
Highlighting that the case involved a U.S. serviceman who did not establish 
his legal relationship to his child before her twenty-first birthday, the Court 
explained that, given the size of the military, Congress had legitimate 
concerns “about a class of children born abroad out of wedlock to alien 
mothers and to American servicemen who would not necessarily know 
about, or be known by, their children.”213 Thus, the Court continued, it was 
reasonable to condition the awarding of citizenship to such children on 
legitimation or paternity actions that establish the possibility that those who 
would become citizens will develop ties to the United States.214 Such actions 
perform a “meaningful purpose for citizen fathers” but would be 
“superfluous for citizen mothers.”215 These strong governmental interests 
not only justify the additional requirements on fathers but they are also “well 
tailored to serve those interests.” 216 The formal acts imposed on unwed 
fathers but not unwed mothers—legitimation, written acknowledgment of 
the father, or court adjudication—lessen fraudulent claims.217 Moreover, 
Congress has an interest in fostering parental ties and ties to the United 
States during the child’s formative years.218 For these reasons, the Court 
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concluded that § 1409(a)(4)’s differential treatment of unwed fathers and 
unwed mothers in their ability to confer citizenship was constitutional.219  
Many have criticized the Court’s gender analysis in Miller and we do not 
revisit those concerns here.220 Our point here is to illustrate how the Court 
in Miller failed to see how § 1409(a)(4) also discriminated on the basis of 
illegitimacy. When examined from the perspective of Lorelyn, the 
nonmarital child, the Court’s opinion illuminates the privileging of the 
traditional, marital family. In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized 
Charlie’s absence in Lorelyn’s life in the Philippines.221 The plurality 
opinion characterized Charlie’s relationship with Lorelyn’s mother as a 
brief one in which Lorelyn was conceived while Charlie was on leave from 
his military duties.222 The opinion noted that Charlie left the country and 
never returned.223 The Court inferred that Lorelyn and Charlie had no 
relationship, and it was unclear from the facts in the opinion whether Charlie 
even knew that he had a child.224 Here, the Court essentially casts the 
relationship between Charlie and Lorelyn’s mother as equivalent to a one-
night stand. In so doing, the Court more easily credited the government’s 
rationale for requiring some form of paternal acknowledgement before the 
nonmarital child turns eighteen. The requirement met Congress’s purpose 
in ensuring proof of paternity, encouraging ties to the father and the country, 
and encouraging healthy relationships between fathers and their nonmarital 
children.225 Framing the issue on sex-equality grounds, the Court agreed that 
sex-based classifications were substantially related to those purposes, and 
characterized them as based on biological differences between the sexes.226 
But they failed to address nonmarital birth status as a salient legal concept.  
Legal scholar Melissa Murray claims that the Court’s characterization of 
the facts in the illegitimacy cases influences outcomes that skew in favor of 
relationships that mimic marriage for the most part. She notes,  
[T]he traditional account of illegitimacy imagines a life where non-
marital children have little contact with their fathers, who, absent 
marriage, have few ties to the household and do little to contribute to 
its financial support. Instead, mothers are assumed to have primary 
 
219. Id. at 444. 
220. See, e.g., Collin O’Connor Udell, Miller v. Albright: Plenary Power, Equal Protection, and 
the Rights of an Alien Love Child, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 621 (1998); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Comment, 
Miller v. Albright: Problems of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (1999); 
Richard G. Wood, When a Majority Loses on the Merits: Miller v. Albright and the Problem of 
Splintered Judgments, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 816 (1998). 
221. Miller, 523 U.S. at 438–39. 
222. See id. at 425. 
223. Id. at 420. 
224. Id. at 438–39. 
225. Id. at 440. 












responsibility for non-marital children, and, it is expected, will lack 
the resources to provide for the care and upkeep of these children. . . . 
[I]llegitimacy often is imagined as engendering an unhealthy, but 
inevitable, dependence on the public fisc—a dependence that is 
wholly at odds with the norms of financial independence that the 
marital family is believed to cultivate.227 
This characterization of illegitimacy certainly holds true in the Miller v. 
Albright plurality opinion. More importantly, the characterization allows 
the Court to circumvent the question of whether these rules create 
disfavored classes of children based on their parents’ marital status. As a 
result, a nonmarital child of a U.S. citizen father could not simply show 
evidence of a biological, or even a bona fide relationship. Instead more 
stringent requirements of parentage apply than those imposed on either the 
marital child or the nonmarital child of a U.S. citizen mother.  
The dissenting opinions similarly examined the issue on gender 
discrimination grounds and, importantly, elided the discriminatory 
treatment of nonmarital children. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, in separate 
dissents, rejected the assumptions behind the sex-based differences in the 
paternity acknowledgement provision. Justice Ginsburg described the 
history of citizenship acquisition for nonmarital children, noting that for 
much of that history, Congress had little regard for the sex of the U.S. 
parent.228 Instead, Congress focused on the child, requiring nonmarital 
children to reside in the United States for five years before their eighteenth 
birthday before they could acquire citizenship.229 She criticized the sex-
based assumptions in the plurality opinion that were “based on 
generalizations (stereotypes) about the way women (or men) are.”230 Justice 
Breyer’s dissent was even more pointed. By switching the facts of the case 
to make Lorelyn’s mother the U.S. citizen, he illustrated the extent to which 
the plurality and concurring opinions depended on stereotypes to come to 
their conclusions.231 Both justices objected to the rule for violating equal 
protection principles based on gender, noting that while Congress is free to 
require close family ties during early and formative years, it could not 
require such a relationship only of fathers and their nonmarital children.232 
As important as their dissents were in promoting gender equality, they failed 
to point out how the rules also negatively impacted nonmarital children. The 
marital presumption built into § 1409(a)(4) privileges marital children who 
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are recognized as “legitimate” and discriminates against nonmarital 
children, who must go through more onerous processes of legitimation, 
paternity acknowledgment, and paternal financial support that remain to this 
day.  
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Miller v. Albright was 
important in the arc of illegitimacy discrimination cases because it signaled 
the turn to gender discrimination theory in subsequent challenges to the 
derivative citizenship rule. As explained supra, in the lower courts, Lorelyn 
and her father claimed both illegitimacy and gender discrimination, making 
a distinction between the two.233 The Supreme Court and the appellate court 
in the case both chose to focus on the gender discrimination claim, leaving 
aside for another day the classifications of children based on their parents’ 
marital status. The Miller v. Albright opinion essentially set the tone for the 
other derivative citizenship cases that followed it. As we show in the next 
case narratives, after Miller v. Albright, and by the time the Court decided 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, the illegitimacy discrimination arguments had 
fallen by the wayside in the courts.  
B. Nguyen v. INS 
The second derivative case that went before the Supreme Court is 
Nguyen v. INS. 234 Unlike Miller, the facts reveal a father who had raised his 
child. Tuan Anh Nguyen was born in Vietnam.235 His father, Joseph 
Boulais, was a U.S. citizen working for a corporate employer in Vietnam.236 
His mother was a Vietnamese citizen who abandoned him at birth.237 
Boulais took Nguyen to live with the family of his new Vietnamese 
girlfriend.238 Nguyen lived in Vietnam until he was almost six years old, 
when his father took him to live in Texas with him.239 Nguyen could have 
sought to enter the United States as a derivative citizen or as an immigrant 
child of a U.S. citizen.240 Instead, he entered the United States as a refugee 
under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Act and eventually became a 
lawful permanent resident.241 He never applied for naturalization. 
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Nguyen was still a lawful permanent resident when he was convicted in 
a Texas state court of sexual assault on a child.242 After he served his 
sentence, the federal government initiated deportation proceedings against 
him.243 It was here that Nguyen claimed U.S. citizenship, and challenged 
the differential rules for mothers and fathers in § 1409. Nguyen’s father also 
produced an order of parentage showing through DNA evidence that he was 
indeed Nguyen’s biological father.244 By the time Nguyen’s father had 
obtained the order of parentage, Nguyen was already twenty-eight years 
old.245  
Similar to the nonmarital child in Miller, Nguyen challenged the effect 
of the rules on nonmarital children on equal protection grounds.246 And, as 
in Miller, the Supreme Court analyzed the case as a gender discrimination 
case rather than an equal protection case based on illegitimacy 
discrimination. Significantly, the Court found that rules requiring 
affirmative steps of a nonmarital father, but not a mother, to prove a filial 
relationship with a nonmarital child did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.247 Its rationale was based on the same stereotypes about how the 
relationship between a mother and her child is different from that of a father 
and a child. First, echoing its reasoning in Miller, the Court noted that the 
biological relationship between a mother and a child is unquestioned 
because the mother is necessarily present at birth.248 While proof of 
motherhood is inherent at birth, proof of fatherhood is not249 and the 
government interest in ensuring a biological relationship justifies the 
gendered differential.  
Second, the Court gave weight to the government’s interest in ensuring 
that the parent-child relationship “consists of the real, everyday ties that 
provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the 
United States.”250 Despite Nguyen’s deep relationship with his father, the 
Court raised the specter of the father who unknowingly conceives a child 
outside of marriage to justify the statutory distinction between the 
nonmarital children of unwed mothers and fathers.251 The Court required 
nonmarital fathers to demonstrate a real relationship through formal 
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channels. A real, everyday tie is presumed, however, if the parent is the 
mother or if the child is born within a marriage.252  
When viewed through the lens of the nonmarital child, the Court’s 
opinion reveals not only § 1409’s privileging of marriage but also its 
treatment of marriage as fostering ties to the United States. Reflecting its 
view of citizenship as a valuable asset to be protected, the Court noted,  
Congress is well within its authority in refusing, absent proof of at 
least the opportunity for the development of a relationship between 
citizen parent and child, to commit this country to embracing a child 
as a citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the United 
States, to the absolute right to enter its borders, and to full 
participation in the political process.253 
Here, the absence of marriage presumes the need to establish and support 
the connection between the child and the parent as well as the child and the 
United States. Children of married U.S. citizens, by contrast, are already 
presumed to not only have such ties to the parents but also to the country. 
Lastly, the Court in Nyugen shows the historical judicial deference to 
congressional decision-making about immigration benefits even if it means 
discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy, which would be deemed 
unlawful, or at the very least, quasi-suspect, under conventional equal 
protection analysis. The Court abdicates its own authority to review 
Congress’s decision on constitutional grounds, and provides that, “[i]f 
citizenship is to be conferred by the unwitting means petitioners urge, so 
that its acquisition abroad bears little relation to the realities of the child’s 
own ties and allegiances, it is for Congress, not this Court, to make that 
determination.”254 In other words, Congress’s categorical rules entrenching 
stereotypes about how families form and exist are entitled to deference even 
when, as here, the facts counter the stereotype.  
In sum, the Court ignored how the rule treats nonmarital parents and 
marital parents differently, giving the most favorable treatment to married 
U.S. citizen parents and their children. Even a nonmarital child of a U.S. 
citizen mother is at a disadvantage, however, compared to a marital child of 
a U.S. citizen mother. A child’s loyalty to the United States is not questioned 
when the child is born inside a marriage. On the other hand, a child born 
outside a marriage must meet physical presence requirements, at the very 
least, to prove worthy of citizenship. The Court ignored the discriminatory 
effects of this preference for marriage in Nguyen v. INS. 
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C. Sessions v. Morales-Santana 
The last and most recent Supreme Court case to address the 
constitutionality of derivative citizenship laws was Sessions v. Morales-
Santana.255 And, like the preceding cases, the facts of Morales-Santana 
demonstrate both gender and illegitimacy discrimination. Crucially, the 
Court’s analysis centered on gender only. This time, however, while the 
Court gestured towards illegitimacy discrimination, it nevertheless failed to 
find it problematic. Luis Ramón Morales-Santana was born in the 
Dominican Republic in 1962 to Yrma Santana Montilla, a Dominican, and 
José Morales, a U.S. citizen.256 Although José Morales was living with 
Yrma Santana at the time, they were not married.257 Jose and Yrma married 
in 1970, at which point José added his name to Luis’s birth certificate as his 
father.258 Contemporaneous records show that José and Yrma lived together 
before, during, and after Luis’s birth, and that José supported his family.259 
The family moved to Puerto Rico, where José was born, and lived with 
family there and in New York until José died in 1976.260 Before Luis was 
born, José had moved to the Dominican Republic to work for a U.S. 
construction company. He was just twenty days short of his nineteenth 
birthday when he left.261 The timing made him ineligible to transfer his 
citizenship to Luis because he had failed to maintain physical presence in 
the United States for five years after the age of fourteen before his son was 
born, as § 1401(a)(7) requires. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, based 
the Court’s decision on gender discrimination against fathers of nonmarital 
children.262 Morales-Santana had, in effect, a derivative claim based on the 
gender differential embedded in the residency requirement of the citizenship 
acquisition provision. The residency provision required fathers, but not 
mothers, of nonmarital children to reside in the United States for five years 
after the age of fourteen to be eligible to transmit their citizenship to their 
nonmarital children.263 Justice Ginsburg focused on facts that demonstrated 
both a vertical parent-child relationship between José and Luis, and a 
horizontal spousal relationship between José and Yrma. There was no doubt 
from these facts that José Morales was a family man who supported his child 
and who, therefore, had a true family relationship with his wife and his 
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child, who happened to be born out of wedlock. The Court’s 
characterization of José Morales as a family man allowed Justice Ginsburg 
to more readily focus on the outdated and overbroad generalizations not just 
about the nonmarital father, but “about the way men and women are.”264 
The majority held that the sex-based differences in the residency 
requirements were subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring the 
government to show that the classification “serves important governmental 
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives.”265 
While Justice Ginsburg distinguished this residency requirement from 
the paternal acknowledgment requirement at issue in Miller and Nguyen, 
she drew from her dissent in Miller to criticize the assumption in the statute 
underlying both provisions that men were less inclined to form relationships 
with their children.266 “Lump characterization of that kind,” she noted, “no 
longer passes equal protection inspection.”267 Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg 
failed to address the illegitimacy discrimination now evidenced in the 
statute. 
IV. HOW ILLEGITIMATE CITIZENSHIP RULES DISCRIMINATE AGAINST 
NONMARITAL CHILDREN AND PERPETUATE TRADITIONAL FAMILY 
NORMS 
The Court’s Morales-Santana decision reveals more starkly the ways in 
which nonmarital children still face differential treatment in citizenship law. 
While the physical presence requirements have been equalized for 
nonmarital mothers and fathers, they have not been equalized for married 
and unmarried parents. The statute continues to require more stringent 
physical presence requirements for unmarried parents who want to pass 
their U.S. citizenship to nonmarital children. In addition, as we have 
demonstrated in Part III, the requirements for establishing the parent-child 
relationship reflect differential treatment between marital and nonmarital 
children. Nonmarital children must demonstrate the filial bond, not just with 
a birth certificate, but with proof of open acknowledgment or legitimation, 
and proof of financial support through childhood.268  
Legitimacy status is the unrecognized mark of inequality that must be 
addressed in the immigration statute. The quasi-suspect category of 
illegitimacy requires scrutiny of both the importance of the government’s 
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interest and the substantial relationship between the legitimation rules and 
the government’s interest. The government might argue, as was done in 
Congressional debates in the 1980s,269 that its interest in detecting fraud is 
served by more stringent standards for proving the filial bond between 
fathers and nonmarital children. Presumably, marriage cures the need to 
prevent fraud, so only nonmarital children must demonstrate a bona fide 
filial bond. The fact of marriage today, however, fails to establish the strong 
filial bond that the rules seek to enforce. Nothing in the statute differentiates 
the marital child whose father abandons her the day after her birth from the 
marital child whose father supports her through her childhood. Both are U.S. 
citizens as long as their parents were married the day they were born. On 
the other hand, the nonmarital child gets no such benefit even if the 
nonmarital father raised her but failed to legitimate her. Here, the child’s 
nonmarital status illuminates the type of sex stereotyping undergirding the 
statute.  
Even if the government had an important interest in detecting fraud back 
when it enacted them, the legitimation rules fail toady because they do not 
reflect contemporary relationships between parents and their children. As 
we discuss below, the cases involving nonmarital children demonstrate that 
the stereotypical assumptions about the rules—that fathers have weak filial 
bonds with their nonmarital children—break down. If the rules are based on 
stereotypes about weak filial bonds, the government cannot show a 
substantial relationship between the rule and the government’s interest in 
preventing fraud.  
The category of the nonmarital child has been expanded, moreover, to 
categories of children that are not—and should not be—considered 
“nonmarital.” This expanded category includes children born within a 
marriage, but conceived through ART. The State Department asserts that a 
child “born in wedlock” is a child whose biological parents are married at 
the time of the child’s birth.270 This position has the effect of limiting 
birthright citizenship to biological, heterosexual parents. It demonstrates 
just how far-reaching and dangerous the discrimination against nonmarital 
children can be. It also demonstrates the incompleteness of the equality 
project at the intersection of immigration and family law, and as 
contemporary views of the family evolve. This section explains the effect 
of illegitimate citizenship rules as they apply not just to the nonmarital 
children of U.S. citizen fathers, but to the broader universe of children that 
the agency has deemed nonmarital. The use of the marital/nonmarital binary 
in the treatment of children leads to several forms of unnecessarily harsh 
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consequences for all relationships that are not the traditional, heterosexual 
marriage between U.S. citizens.  
Importantly, the Court’s admonition in Morales-Santana regarding the 
assumptions embedded in the residency requirement about how “men and 
women are”271 applies just as much to the legitimation provision. If we 
scrutinize the legitimation requirement with “new insights and societal 
understandings [that] can reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once passed 
unnoticed and unchallenged,”272 as the Court did in Morales-Santana, we 
can conclude that no important government interest justifies differences in 
treatment of nonmarital children. The legitimation requirement continues to 
be embedded with moral judgments about marriage, sex outside of 
marriage, and who is ultimately responsible for children born outside of 
marriage.273 The Court’s holding in Morales-Santana exposes the now 
outdated marriage preference still embedded in the provision. 
A. The Historical Stereotypes Embedded in the Marriage Preference 
This section discusses the historical context for the marriage preference, 
juxtaposing the trends in state family law to dismantle it with forces in 
immigration law to further entrench it. It then provides a framework for 
breaking down the preference in immigration law by revealing the 
stereotypes that continue to keep the marriage preference alive in 
immigration law.  
Initially, the immigration statute was silent about the rights of nonmarital 
children born abroad to derive citizenship from their fathers.274 The agency 
interpreted congressional silence on the issue by taking cues from state law 
and following the common law rules requiring fathers to claim children 
inside a marriage, and mothers to claim them outside a marriage.275 States 
codified these rules in their family laws.276 The marriage preference in state 
law was clear: state recognition of nonmarital children required clear proof 
of the parent-child bond.277 By contrast, the state required no evidence 
beyond a marriage certificate to recognize marital children.278 Most states 
presumed that a child born within a marriage was presumptively the child 
 
271. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1689. 
272. Id. at 1690 (alteration in original) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 
(2015)).  
273. Mayeri, supra note 141, at 1289.  
274. Collins, supra note 29, at 2165. 
275. Id. at 2186. 
276. Id. 
277. ERNST FREUND, ILLEGITIMACY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 10 (1919).  












of the husband,279 in part because marriage did the work of maintaining 
order, in contra-distinction to the loose morals and disorder characterized 
by sex outside of marriage.280 Most states did not recognize a nonmarital 
child as having a father until the child’s parents married.281 The nonmarital 
child derived no rights from the father until a marriage occurred.282 The 
immigration system adopted this restrictive view of the nonmarital child’s 
rights, first through agency decisions,283 then through the derivative 
citizenship provisions codified within the statute.284  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, states began to remove legal 
impediments to nonmarital status for children.285 Even after states began to 
loosen standards for recognizing nonmarital children, however, the 
immigration agency continued to impose illegitimate citizenship rules. For 
example, the agency interpreted the term legitimation in the statute to 
require that state laws recognize nonmarital children as having the full rights 
of marital children in order to be considered legitimated under immigration 
law. The initial rationale for the marriage preference—the right of the state 
to express a preference—gave way in this interpretation to an 
institutionalized preference for marriage in immigration law, even when 
states no longer opted to maintain a marriage preference in family law.286 
The stereotype that marriage conveyed and sustained a sense of order as 
against a danger of disorder remained embedded in the immigration statute.  
The gap between the marriage preference in immigration law and state 
dismantling of the preference only grew as the constitutional challenges to 
state laws based on illegitimacy discrimination gained ground.287 At the 
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same time that lawsuits forced states to reconsider laws favoring marriage, 
the immigration statute’s marriage preference remained frozen in place.288  
Congressional attempts to dismantle the marriage preference in 
citizenship law had only limited success in the 1980s, in part because of a 
new rationale for illegitimate citizenship rules: fraud.289 Congressional 
members as well as the immigration agency were concerned that a simple 
parental acknowledgement requirement would introduce unmitigated fraud, 
in part because, they argued, many of these children were the products of 
one-night stands that should not sustain a citizenship claim.290 The 
racialized implications of the fraud rationale remained in the background of 
debates surrounding alternatives to legitimation to prove the family 
relationship. Again, stereotypical notions of loose morals and threats to 
marital order lay at the foundation of these concerns. In response, Congress 
introduced a requirement that nonmarital fathers demonstrate a willingness 
to financially support a child in addition to physical presence requirements 
showing loyalty to the United States.291 The rationale behind the extra 
requirements was that they operated to establish a true bond with a child, 
something that was assumed within a marriage, and that was necessary to 
fulfill the purpose of the statute to unify families.292 The anti-fraud 
rationales were powerful motivators during this period, as the debate 
centered on American G.I.s having consorted with women during their 
activity in foreign wars.293 Thus, even as the immigration statute 
incorporated parental acknowledgment as a way to loosen the strict 
legitimation rules, Congress required proof of parental financial support as 
an additional condition for establishing the nonmarital parent-child 
 
288. Id.  
289. See Efficiency of the Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearing on H.R. 5087 Before 
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 
35 (1979) [Hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth Harper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa 
Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State); Hearing, supra, at 2–3 (statement of David 
Crosland, Acting Comm’r, INS); see also Collins, supra note 108, at 1761. 
290. Hearing, supra note 289, at 35. 
291. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2018) (as amended by the 
Immigration and Nationalty Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655, 3657 (1986)). 
292. See Review of Immigration Problems: Hearing on H.R. 10993 Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 133 (1975 & 
1976) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); Collins, supra note 
108, at 1760–61; Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and the Durability 
of Gender-Based Nationality Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL 
73 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young eds., 2016). 
293. See, e.g., Amerasian Immigration Proposals: Hearing on S. 1698 Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 38–39 (1982) (statement 
of Hon. Alan C. Nelson) (considering whether to extend “preferential treatment” to “children of United 
States Armed Forces personnel”); 15 OSCAR M. TRELLES, II & JAMES F. BAILEY, III, IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY ACTS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 1950–1978, at 383 (1979); 
Review of Immigration Problems, supra note 292, at 131–40 (addressing, among other matters, 












relationship.294 These new rules adopted in the 1980s maintained, if not 
entrenched, the marriage preference. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, especially the Court’s latest 
pronouncement in Morales-Santana, has produced an even more entrenched 
bias in favor of marriage. The decision challenges the stereotypical 
assumptions that nonmarital mothers automatically have a bond with their 
children while fathers do not.295 While the decision puts nonmarital mothers 
and fathers on equal footing, it creates an inequality between marital and 
nonmarital children. This, in turn, reveals a heavy preference for marriage 
on the assumption that parents who were married upon a child’s birth have 
both a greater bond with the child and deeper loyalties to the United 
States.296 Children born inside a two-U.S.-citizen-parent marriage can 
derive citizenship from parents whose bond, as well as whose loyalty to the 
United States, is automatically assumed. Because loyalty to the United 
States is not in question, there is no need for a residency requirement. Nor 
is further proof needed of an established parent-child bond if the child was 
born within a marriage. In sum, the anti-fraud rationales heavily motivate 
the implementation of illegitimate citizenship rules. 
B. The Consequences of the Marriage Preference: How Derivative 
Citizenship Rules Perpetuate the Heterosexual Marriage Norm 
The marriage preference in immigration law that produced illegitimate 
citizenship rules has even broader effects. It reveals an institutionalized 
preference for the U.S.-citizen, married, heterosexual couple. This 
preference manifests itself both in the statute, and in ways that the agency 
scrutinizes relationships that lie outside of this paradigmatic structure.297 
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The norm is both a preference for heterosexual marriage and a preference 
for heterosexual marriage. 
The marriage preference reflects an immigration benefits hierarchy, with 
the two-citizen married couple at its zenith. This hierarchy produces 
anomalies as the nature of families evolves, and the immigration system 
tries to grapple with outdated rules. This section describes three scenarios, 
including the stories embedded in Nguyen, Miller, and Morales-Santana, 
depicting the evolving definitions of family that find no place within the 
immigration system. These scenarios demonstrate the failure of 
immigration law’s marriage preference to capture the reality of today’s 
families in the United States.  
1. The Marriage Preference and the Primary Caretaker Nonmarital 
Father  
The category of nonmarital child of an unmarried father represents the 
quintessential stereotype embedded in illegitimate citizenship rules. The 
stereotype, as exemplified in congressional and court discussions, is 
reflected in the G.I. who serves overseas, engages in a sexual relationship 
in which a child is conceived, and subsequently leaves the child behind.298 
The stereotypical view is that the child is claiming a benefit—citizenship—
that she does not deserve because, presumably, she has no relationship with 
her father. The stereotypical view of the father is that he carelessly wastes a 
valuable asset: citizenship.  
The facts in cases such as Miller, Nguyen, and Morales-Santana 
represent the first wave of cases challenging the traditional marriage norm. 
They demonstrate the counter-narrative: fathers who are involved in the 
raising of their nonmarital children, but who, for various reasons, failed to 
meet the formal requirements of the statute to prove they were really 
“fathers.” The circumstances surrounding the family relationship are at 
issue in each case, as the fathers attempted to demonstrate they really were 
parents in the traditional sense even if they were not husbands. These cases 
involve a set of counter-narratives that challenge the government’s narrative 
of possible fraudulent—and illegitimate—family relationships. The facts in 
these cases demonstrated that the nonmarital fathers could still parent in 
meaningful and substantive, if non-traditional, ways despite not having 
fulfilled the marriage function.299   
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Charlie Miller, of Miller v. Albright, had a long-distance relationship 
with his daughter Lorelyn throughout her youth and had frequent direct 
communication with her, even though they did not live with each other.300 
Neither knew that the immigration statute required paternity 
acknowledgement before Lorelyn turned eighteen.301 So, even though he 
tried to legally establish his relationship with his daughter under state law, 
he could not perfect it under immigration law.302 He could not perfect it 
because his family did not mirror the ideal married, heterosexual citizen 
couple.  
The same occurred when Luis Morales-Santana, the respondent in 
Morales-Santana, sought to have his parents’ family relationship 
recognized under immigration law. Morales-Santana’s parents married 
several years after he was born, thus legitimizing him under Puerto Rican 
law, where his father resided before he left the country.303 Luis Morales-
Santana came as close to a traditional family as one could get without being 
born into a marriage. Nonetheless, instead of focusing on the vast difference 
in treatment between marital and nonmarital children, the Court focused on 
the gender differential between unmarried mothers and fathers, to the 
detriment of Luis, a nonmarital son under immigration law rules. Again, 
Luis’s family failed to reflect the traditional married U.S. citizen family 
unit. 
The case against nonmarital children is even more striking in Nguyen v. 
INS, because Nguyen was actually raised by his U.S. citizen father in the 
United States from age six.304 Nguyen, a lawful permanent resident raised 
and supported by his father, failed to fulfill the technical requirement of 
legitimation by court order before the age of eighteen.305 In this case, the 
requirement was truly a technicality because Nguyen’s father was 
physically and fiscally responsible for his son for the vast majority of his 
life.306  
In each of these cases, the nonmarital father was, in practice, if not 
legally, fathering his nonmarital child. This “nontraditional” role was not 
only elided but it was also the basis for granting fewer benefits to the 
nonmarital child than the marital child.307 Crucially, the Court failed to 
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explain why marriage was a necessary component for passing down 
citizenship in the first instance. The presumptive role of the nonmarried 
father was scrutinized, with the presumptive role of the unmarried mother 
in the background. Although that presumption was finally struck down in 
Morales-Santana, the presumption that only marital children are the issue 
of their parents was never in question in these cases. Thus, the Department 
of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) continues to direct its officers to 
scrutinize the parental relationship of nonmarital children.308 The marriage 
preference is clear in these cases, requiring that nonmarital parents do much 
more than married parents to justify citizenship for their children.  
2. I Have Two Moms: The Heterosexual Marriage Preference, the 
LGBTQIA Partnership, and Artificial Insemination 
The rules regarding nonmarital children seep into the interpretation of 
the INA as it applies to same-sex married couples. The assumption that 
children born within a marriage are more deserving than nonmarital children 
gives the agency leeway to define the category of the nonmarital child. The 
agency has determined in several ART cases that, in effect, even some 
marital children can be considered “nonmarital.” The agency’s 
interpretation reveals a bias in favor of heterosexual marriage.  
The preference for heterosexual marriage reveals itself when we 
consider the children of same-sex partners conceived through artificial 
insemination. The INA continues to be silent on gay marriage, although the 
immigration agency under the Obama administration announced that it 
would recognize gay marriage as valid under immigration law after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor.309 There, the Court 
struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, holding that its prohibition of 
same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause.310 Shortly 
thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security issued a guideline 
instructing the agency to recognize same-sex marriage as a valid marriage 
for immigration law purposes.311 At the same time, in the face of 
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congressional silence, the agency has opted to treat children born through 
ART like nonmarital children.  
Take the case of Allison Blixt and Stefania Zaccari and their children. 
Blixt is a U.S. citizen married to Zaccari, an Italian citizen.312 Both parents 
are listed on the birth certificate of their son, Lucas, who was born in 
London.313 Stefania was artificially inseminated.314 Because Blixt could not 
prove that her son was a blood relative, the state department refused to 
register the child as a U.S. citizen.315 The state department’s rules require a 
showing of a biological or genetic link between the parent and child for 
transmission of citizenship.316  
The Foreign Affairs Manual for the agency, used by field officers to 
guide their decisions, describes what should happen in the case of a child 
born abroad to same-sex couples. The FAM requires officers to seek 
biological proof of a relationship in certain instances, including birth 
through ART.317  
Although not completely determinative, children born in wedlock to 
heterosexual parents start with a presumption that they are the issue of the 
marriage.318 No such presumption exists for same-sex couples because the 
question of artificial insemination always lingers. Thus, while the rule 
affects heterosexual parents who undergo artificial insemination, it unduly 
targets same-sex couples for whom ART always raises questions about the 
blood relationship between parent and child.  
There may be other avenues in the statute to recognize the relationship 
between Allison and her child. Allison may qualify as the child’s 
stepmother, for example. The agency’s interpretation of the statute, 
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however, has been facilitated by the creation and maintenance of the 
nonmarital child category. The anachronistic view of children is now 
deployed in new and evolving ways even as the family moves away from 
the traditional heterosexual marriage. Consequently, in the ART cases, 
officers require proof of a blood relationship even if the parents are 
married,319 a framework descending from the nonmarital child category. 
3. I Have Two Dads: The Marriage Preference and Surrogacy 
Arrangements 
As with artificial insemination, children experience the discriminatory 
preference for the two-U.S.-citizen, heterosexual married couple in 
immigration law when the child is conceived through a surrogacy 
agreement.320 Take the seemingly simple case of Derek Mize and Jonathan 
Gregg.321 Both are U.S. citizens.322 Jonathan lived in England most of his 
life, and moved to the United States to live with Derek.323 They married in 
New York and settled in Decatur, Georgia.324 When they decided to have a 
child, they entered into a surrogacy agreement with a surrogate in England, 
and they used Jonathan’s sperm.325 Their daughter Simone was born in 
England, where the surrogate lived.326 Here is where immigration law’s 
preference for the heterosexual married family unit kicks in. First, the 
agency refused to treat Derek and Jonathan as a U.S. citizen married couple. 
Instead, it invoked a rule that all children born through ART would be DNA-
tested and evaluated according to the citizenship of the biological parents.327 
While the rule, on its face, affects all ART families, it has a much greater 
effect on same-sex parents, because all same-sex marriages are subject to it. 
Thus, the statute applies presumptively only to children born within a 
traditional heterosexual marriage. The same-sex marriage is treated 
according to the rules for a nonmarital relationship.  
 
319. Id. §§ 304.3, 304.1-2. Blixt recently filed a lawsuit challenging the State Department’s rule. 
See Blixt v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:18-cv-00124-EGS-RMM (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2018). 
320. See 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.3-4 (DEP’T OF STATE 2018). Surrogacy and other 
forms of ART give rise to doubt in the biological relationship (and, therefore, parentage) between a U.S. 
citizen and a child, even if the child is born in wedlock. In these cases, an officer can seek more evidence 
to establish the parent-child relationship.  
321. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Mize v. Pompeo, No. 1:19-cv-3331-MLB 
(N.D. Ga. July 29, 2019). 
322. Id. at 2. 
323. Id. at 5, 15. 
324. Id. at 2, 15, 18. 
325. Id. at 2. 
326. Id. 












In the case of Jonathan Gregg, the consequences are compounded. The 
surrogate is a British citizen.328 The immigration agency treats Simone as 
the nonmarital child of a U.S. citizen and foreign-born spouse.329 So, not 
only must Jonathan “legitimate” Simone—a requirement that is typically 
not required when a child is born within a marriage—but he must also meet 
the five-year physical presence requirement left intact after Morales-
Santana.330 Jonathan did not live in the United States the required five years 
before moving to England, so he cannot pass his citizenship to Simone as a 
result. In July 2019, Mize and Gregg sued the federal government to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause, and this case is sure to reveal the issues we 
address in this Article.331 
A similar case produced results that are just as illogical as those in the 
Mize-Gregg scenario. Andrew Dvash-Banks (a U.S. citizen) and Elad 
Dvash-Banks (an Israeli citizen), a married gay couple, fathered twins 
through artificial insemination with a surrogate in Canada.332 The couple 
inseminated a Canadian surrogate with sperm from each spouse, resulting 
in the birth of twins, A.J. and E.J., in Canada.333 When the couple sought 
passports for the twins, the immigration agency interpreted the immigration 
statute to require DNA testing for the twins.334 In other words, instead of 
treating the children as the marital children of a U.S. citizen parent, the 
agency treated the children as the nonmarital children of a U.S. citizen father 
and the Canadian surrogate mother.335 The result was that DNA testing 
became the key to establishing the blood relationship with the U.S. citizen 
parent. E.J., who did not have Andrew’s DNA, could not derive citizenship, 
according to the agency, even though the child was born within the 
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marriage.336 On the other hand, his twin brother, A.J., who shared Andrew’s 
DNA, could derive citizenship. The marriage preference did not work, in 
other words, to protect the marital child of a gay marriage because the 
family did not fit the paradigmatic profile of the preferred heterosexual 
married couple. Ultimately, the difference between nonmarital and marital 
children surfaced in this case to create different treatment for twins born 
from a surrogate relationship.  
When the couple sued, the district court judge granted citizenship to E.J., 
noting that the statute was silent about the need to prove a biological 
relationship between the marital child and his parents.337 The court 
interpreted the statute as not creating such a requirement. It focused on the 
fact of the couple’s marriage, thereby reinforcing that there is a difference 
between the citizenship requirements for marital and nonmarital children.338 
The court refused, however, to grant a declaratory judgment requiring the 
agency to treat all children within a same-sex marriage as marital 
children.339 These cases demonstrate that the marriage preference does not 
work in immigration law to protect the marital child in same-sex marriages. 
These families do not fit the paradigmatic profile of the preferred 
heterosexual married couple. These are the anomalies created from treating 
nonmarital and marital children differently, but also from having a 
paradigmatic marriage preference for the two-U.S.-citizen heterosexual 
married family. If there were no difference between nonmarital and marital 
parents, the U.S. citizen father would pass on his citizenship simply by 
showing ties (in this case a nuclear family) to the child. 
That the agency required DNA testing at all for this case demonstrates 
that the agency still thinks about children born within a U.S.-citizen 
heterosexual marriage as the norm. Its anti-fraud rationales continue to 
motivate stereotypes about the “normal” way to have kids: all but the two-
U.S.-citizen paradigm must continue to jump through hoops to establish 
citizenship.  
C. Dismantling the Marriage Preference 
Some might ask why the preference for U.S. citizen married parents 
should not be enforced. It seems rational to bestow a most-preferred status 
on the children of a U.S. citizen marriage. This conceptualization distorts 
the issue because it focuses on U.S. citizenship rather than on marriage. It 
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is the heterosexual marriage preference that is both outdated and ahistorical. 
It is ahistorical because it fails to account for early derivation rules and the 
stereotypes on which they were based. It is outdated because it is entrenched 
at a time when states are ridding their family laws of marriage-preference-
based rules, and it fails to recognize how families are evolving.  
The marriage preference rooted itself in citizenship law at the same time 
that citizenship became the racialized marker of inclusion in the polity. The 
preferred status of the two-citizen married couple reflects the federal 
government’s long-time race-based efforts to exclude from citizenship those 
who did not fit within the conception of American. That conception 
included nonmarital families, and often these were also families excluded 
based on race. The “othering” of nonmarital families was, in other words, 
part of the race-based “othering” of nonwhite residents seeking citizenship.  
Ironically, early congressional pronouncements about the relationship 
between fathers and their nonmarital children, as well as mothers and their 
nonmarital children, might actually point to a sounder set of principles on 
which to base derivative citizenship. Under the original principles of filius 
nullius, the child of a nonmarital father was not recognized, and, therefore, 
derived no rights from the father.340 Immigration law incorporated this 
principle, then prevalent in state family law.341 Children of nonmarital 
mothers, on the other hand, derived rights from their mothers, including 
citizenship status.342 When the principle of filius nullius began to break 
down, and nonmarital fathers were allowed to recognize their children 
through processes such as legitimation, the immigration agency, and later 
the statute, followed suit, allowing for citizenship derivation as long as 
fathers legitimated their children under state law. The child was then able to 
derive citizenship from the nonmarital father from the date of its birth.343 
Importantly, because the relationship was re-recognized as legitimate from 
birth, the nonmarital child was treated just like a marital child, with the same 
residency requirements and without a need to establish financial support.344 
In other words, the main driver of citizenship derivation was not marriage 
but the establishment of the parent-child relationship. This set of principles 
divorced the determination of derivation from whether the parents were 
married.  
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The introduction of anti-fraud rationales has allowed for what is today a 
more restrictive derivation scheme for the children of unmarried parents. 
The stereotype that sustains this scheme is that of the American foreign 
traveler (usually a military enlistee) trapped into recognizing a child after a 
one-night stand. The more restrictive provisions in the statute raise the 
specter of the American needing protection from possible fraudulent claims 
arising out of such short liaisons. While Morales-Santana fixed the gender 
differential among nonmarital parents by breaking down gender 
stereotypes, it kept the structural restrictions against the nonmarital parent 
in place. Now, the old stereotypes protecting the American foreign traveler 
are still in place, and they apply to both mothers and fathers. The stereotype 
upholding the restrictions, including the physical presence requirement, 
makes no sense for nonmarital fathers in an age of easy DNA testing, and it 
makes less sense for nonmarital mothers. The value in Morales-Santana lies 
in the Court’s systematic breakdown of old stereotypes. The same can be 
done for the stereotypes still undergirding the more restrictive requirements 
for nonmarital parents. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article drew attention to the unnoticed ongoing discriminatory 
treatment of nonmarital children in derivative citizenship law. The 
conventional narrative about parentage law is that although historically, the 
law unjustly punished children who were born out of wedlock, equal 
protection principles today provide that all children have the same rights, 
regardless of their parents’ marital status. This narrative, however, is 
incomplete. As we argued in this Article, it overlooks the harsh treatment 
that nonmarital children who are born abroad experience in seeking to 
derive citizenship from their unwed U.S. citizen parents. In particular, this 
Article contended that derivative citizenship rules impose onerous rules on 
nonmarital children based on their status. By drawing attention to this 
ongoing unconstitutional treatment of nonmarital children, this Article 
revealed the extent to which derivative citizenship rules have escaped the 
progressive turn in parentage law that began in the 1960s. Additionally, this 
Article demonstrated how citizenship rules affect not only parentage law 
but marriage law as well by punishing those who are unmarried and in effect 
promoting the traditional family. Our analysis revealed the extent to which 
marriage does the work of ensuring a family relationship in immigration 
law.  
In drawing attention to this ongoing discriminatory treatment of 
nonmarital children, we call on Congress to invalidate these illegitimate 












children, in recognition of evolved family law constructs for acknowledging 
parentage. Once a child is recognized by a parent, the child should have all 
the rights inherent in being a child, including citizenship. To that end, 
Congress should eliminate 8 U.S.C. § 1409, which creates extra 
requirements for establishing the filial relationship for nonmarital children. 
This change should resolve the issues that occur with same-sex marriages, 
civil unions, or other forms of partnership other than marriage, which are 
currently analyzed under § 1409.345  
 
345. In suggesting our prescription, we recognize that there may be concerns regarding the 
privileging of children who are the biological children of U.S. citizen unmarried fathers. The debate 
between biological parentage and other forms of parentage is beyond the scope of this Article.  
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